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THE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY OF FUNGI AND FRAUD
WENDY GERWICK COUTURE & B. CLIFFORD GERWICK**

ABSTRACT

In this Article, the authors-a law professor and a biologistoffer a fresh perspective on the use of broad federal fraud
statutes to combat fraud by drawing a comparison with the use
of multi-site fungicides to combat plant disease. Multi-site
fungicides are effective at preventing the evolution of resistant
strains of fungi, but they are subject to increased regulatory
scrutiny amid concerns about off-target toxicity. Similarly,
broad fraud statutes serve as a stopgap to prevent the evolution
of new types of fraud, but they are widely criticized as unduly
vague and as interfering with the operation of specific fraud
Biologists' successful alternatives to multi-site
statutes.
fungicides inform the discussion of alternative ways to combat
fraud that avoid the problems associated with broad fraud
statutes.
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INTRODUCTION

What do fraud and fungi have in common? In this Article,
the authors-a law professor and a biologist-offer a fresh
perspective on the use of broad federal fraud statutes to combat
fraud by drawing a comparison with the use of multi-site
fungicides to combat plant disease. The potential for fraud
perpetrators to "evolve," thus avoiding the reach of antifraud
legislation, is central to the debate about the appropriate breadth
of fraud statutes.' Similarly, the evolution of plant diseases that
1. Thomas Rybarczyk, Comment, Preserving a More Perfect Union:
Melding Two Circuits Approaches to Save a Valuable Weapon in the Fight
Against PoliticalCorruption,2010 Wis. L. REV. 1119, 1129 (noting the mail
fraud statute's role in "stopping the ever-evolving schemer from using the

No. 1]

The Evolutionary Biology of Fungi and Fraud

73

are fungicide-resistant is a crucial issue confronting plant
biologists. 2 The strategies successfully invoked by biologists to
combat plant disease in the face of evolving fungi, including the
role of single-site and multi-site fungicides, provide guidance
about successful strategies that could be used to fight fraud in
the face of evolving fraud perpetrators, including the role of
specific and broad fraud statutes.
The appropriate role of broad federal statutes in combating
fraud is an especially relevant issue in the wake of the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Skilling v. United
States, which significantly limited the reach of the federal mail
and wire fraud statutes. 4 The mail and wire fraud statutes5
prohibit the fraudulent deprivation, not only of money or
property, but also of the "intangible right of honest services." 6
Before the Skilling decision, this so-called "honest services
fraud" provision was used to prosecute a broad range of
conduct, including undisclosed self-dealing by public officials
and private employees. 7 In Skilling, however, the Court
significantly limited the reach of these statutes by interpreting
"honest services fraud" as including only frauds involving
mails as an instrument of fraud") (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S.
306, 314 (1896)).
2.

Jonathan Gressel, Evolving Understanding of the Evolution of

Herbicide Resistance, 65 PEST MGMT. SCI. 1164, 1164 (2009) (explaining
that the problem of fungicide resistance has "all to do with evolutionary
biology"); Derek W. Hollomon & Keith J. Brent, Combating PlantDiseases
- The Darwin Connection, 65 PEST MGMT. SCI. 1156, 1156 (2009), available

at http://tripsaver.lib.ncsu.edu/pdf/84007671.pdf (recognizing that "the
development of strains resistant to chemical treatments[]" is one of the
"evolutionary trends" that causes "new problems of plant disease");
Margaret McGrath, Fungicides and Mode of Action, 15 GREENHOUSE
at
available
2005),
(Sept.
NEWS
PRODUCT
http://www.gpnmag.com/Fungicides-and-Mode-of-Action--article6328
(explaining that fungicide resistance is "obtained through evolutionary
processes").
3. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
4. Id. at 2928.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (West 2011) ("Frauds and swindles"); 18 U.S.C. §
1343 (West 2011) ("Fraud by wire, radio, or television").
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (West 2011) (declared unconstitutionally vague by
Skilling when applied to conduct other than bribery and kickbacks).
7. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), superseded
by Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2932.
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bribery and kickbacks. 8 In response, during the 111th Congress,
members of both houses introduced bills to enact the Honest
Services Restoration Act in order to restore the formerly broad
reach of "honest services fraud" to include frauds involving
undisclosed self-dealing. 9 As Senator Leahy, one of the
sponsors of the Senate bill, explained, "[t]he legislation will
restore critical tools used by investigators and prosecutors to
combat public corruption and corporate fraud, which the
Supreme Court dramatically weakened in Skilling v. United
States."' 0 The 111th Congress did not enact the Honest
Services Restoration Act; but the Act has been reintroduced in
the House," and Senator Leahy has expressed hope of finding
"a bipartisan solution to fixing honest services fraud." 1 2
In Part II of this Article, the authors demonstrate that multisite fungicides and broad fraud statutes, such as the mail and
wire fraud statutes,' 3 operate in similar ways to prevent the
evolution of resistant strains of fungi and fraud. In Part III, the
authors discuss the regulatory pressure facing multi-site
fungicides and the parallel criticisms leveled at broad fraud
statutes, including Skilling's curtailment of the reach of the mail
and wire fraud statutes. In Part IV, the authors summarize the
alternative means of managing fungicide resistance that
scientists have developed in the face of increased regulatory
scrutiny of multi-site fungicides and draw from these solutions
A brief
to propose alternatives to broad fraud statutes.
conclusion follows, with proposals to prevent new forms of
8. Id. at 2931 ("To preserve the statute without transgressing
constitutional limitations, we now hold that § 1346 criminalizes only the
bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law.").
9. Honest Services Restoration Act, H.R. 6391, 111th Cong. (2d. Sess,
2010) (seeking to expand the deprivation of honest services to include
undisclosed self-dealing by a public official); Honest Services Restoration
Act, S. 3854, 111th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2010) (seeking to expand the definition
even further to include undisclosed private self-dealing by a corporate officer
or director).
10. 156 CONG. REc. S7631 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Leahy for himself, Sen. Whitehouse, and Sen. Kaufman).
11. Honest Services Restoration Act, H.R. 1468, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011).
12. 157 CONG. REc. S905 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Leahy for himself and Sen. Cornyn).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1341; 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

No. 1]

The Evolutionary Biology ofFungi and Fraud

75

fraud, while minimizing the adverse impacts of broad fraud
statutes.
II. MULTI-SITE FUNGICIDES AND BROAD FRAUD STATUTES
PREVENT THE EVOLUTION OF RESISTANT STRAINS OF FUNGI AND
FRAUD
Multi-site fungicides, which affect multiple target sites, are
far less susceptible to resistance than single-site fungicides. 1 4
Similarly, broad fraud statutes like the mail and wire fraud

statutes, which focus on the fraudulent behavior itself rather
than the object of the fraud, are less susceptible to evasion than
specific fraud statutes.' 5 In this way, multi-site fungicides and
broad fraud statutes play a similar role in preventing the

evolution of resistant strains of fungi and fraud.
A.

The Use ofMulti-Site Fungicides to Combat the Evolution
of Resistant Fungi
"Fungicides," defined broadly are "agents used to control
plant diseases caused by fungi. 6 Indeed, fungicides are the
most effective weapon against plant disease, which can
devastate crop yields and interfere with food supply.17 In light
of the importance of fungicides in combating plant disease, the
evolution of fungicide resistance is one of the most serious
Fungicide
threats to global food supply and fiber production.'
14. See Hollomon & Brent, supra note 2, at 1160-61.
15. See, e.g., Jason T. Elder, Comment, Federal Mail Fraud Unleashed:
Revisiting the Criminal Catch-All, 77 OR. L. REv. 707, 707 (1998) ("The

mail fraud statute occupies a unique position in federal criminal law as one
of the last broad and amorphous criminal statutes.").
16. Keith J. Brent & Derek W. Hollomon, Fungicide Resistance: The
Assessment of Risk, FUNGICIDE RESISTANCE ACTION COMMITTEE, 6 (2d
at
available
2007),
ed.
revised
http://www.frac.info/frac/publication/anhang/FRACMono2_2007.pdf
[hereinafter Fungicide Resistance].
17. See, e.g., Ulrich Gisi & Helge Sierotzki, Fungicide Modes of Action
and Resistance in Downy Mildews, 122 EUR. J. PLANT PATHOL. 157, 157

(2008) ("[D]owny mildews are among the most devastating plant diseases.
To avoid yield losses, disease control is required mainly by using chemical
products.").
18. Gisi & Sierotzki, supra note 17, at 158 ("This development [of
resistance] is a common phenomenon in agricultural practice and is based on
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resistance is a quintessential example of "survival of the
fittest"1 9 because resistant strains of fungi, which contain one or
more resistant variants of a gene that renders the fungicide
ineffective, are naturally present in the genetic background of
the fungi population. 2 0 The fungicide kills, or inhibits, the
growth and reproduction of all but these resistant strains. 2 1 The
unaffected resistant strains remain able to infect the host plant
and-depending on their fitness-multiply. 2 2
The likelihood of fungicide resistance depends on whether
the fungicide's mode-of-action is single-site or multi-site, due to
the former being far more susceptible to resistance.23 Singlesite fungicides act on only one target site, 24 while multi-site
the selection of resistant individuals by the use of fungicides."); Maria
Lodovica Gullino et al., Mancozeb: Past, Present, and Future, 94 PLANT
at
available
(2010),
1081
1076,
DISEASE

("Fungicide
http://apsjoumals.apsnet.org/doi/pdf/10.1094/PDIS-94-9-1076
resistance is a serious and intensively studied issues in the management of
many key fungal diseases of most crops."); Hollomon & Brent, supra note 2,
at 1160 ("Fungicide resistance . . . is one of the core problems limiting

sustainable food and fibre [sic] production worldwide.").
19. Hollomon & Brent, supra note 2, at 1162. "Pathogen adaptations to
varietal resistance and to fungicides provide excellent 'living examples' of
survival of the fittest' that demonstrate how rapidly evolutionary forces can
operate in a wide range of microorganisms, and how difficult they are to hold
back." Id.
20. Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 14.

"The potential in the

target pathogen for mutations conferring resistance is the basic cause of a
resistance risk for a new fungicide." Id.
21. Gullino et al., supra note 18, at 1081. "The development of resistance
in a fungal population is the inevitable response to the selection pressure of
fungicide use." Id.
22. J. Dekker, Development of Resistance to Modern Fungicides and
Strategiesfor its Avoidance, in MODERN SELECTIVE FUNGICIDES 23, 23 (H.

Lyr 2d. ed., 1995).
23. Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 3 (stating that "a single rather

than a multiple site of action" is a "positive indicator[] of risk"); Gisi &
Sierotzki, supra note 17, at 158 ("In contrast to multi-site fungicides, most
single-site inhibitors bear a high intrinsic risk of causing the evolution of
resistant pathogen sub-populations."); Gullino et al., supra note 18, at 1081
("Fungicide resistance . . . threatens the commercial potential of products,

particularly those having a single-site mode of action.").
24. Gisi & Sierotzki, supra note 17, at 158. "Generally, single sitefungicides act against a very specific step in the metabolism of pathogens
and have only few side effects on other processes or non-target organisms."
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fungicides affect multiple target sites. 2 5 One genetic mutation
may be all that is required to resist a single-site fungicide. 26in
contrast, resistance to a multi-site fungicide is much more
difficult to achieve because there must be mutations with
respect to multiple target sites. 27 For example, if each target site
has a frequency of resistant alleles of I x 10-6, then the
frequency of having two alleles in a single strain and imparting
resistance to both target sites is lx10 2.28 As explained in
evolutionary terms by biochemists Derek W. Hollomon and
Keith J. Brent:
In terms of Darwin's ideas, the more mutations needed to
overcome fungicide action, the slower the development of
resistance will be. This explains why multisite fungicides
have proved durable, and why resistance caused by a single
gene change develops more rapidly than when it depends on
the additive effects of changes in several genes. 29
Resistance to single-site fungicides is common because only
one mutation is required, while resistance to multi-site
fungicides is statistically very unlikely because so many
mutations are required. 30
Id.
25. Hollomon & Brent, supra note 2, at 1160 (explaining that multi-site
fungicides "target many metabolic steps").
26. Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 9 (explaining that single-site
inhibitors are more prone to resistance because "[a] single target site can be
rendered resistant through one mutation changing a single DNA-base in the
target gene and, consequently, just one amino acid in the target protein[]");
P.E. Russell, A Century of FungicideEvolution, 143 J. OF AGRIC. SCI. 11, 19
(2005) (explaining that chemistry "based on a single site of action" is
"usually accompanied by resistance to that chemistry being governed by a
simple genetic change in the pathogen").
27. Hollomon & Brent, supra note 2, at 1160 (stating that multi-site
fungicides "require more than one mutation to overcome inhibition");
Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 9 (explaining that fungicides with
multiple targets are less prone to resistance because "[s]everal mutations
must occur simultaneously to confer resistance at multiple target-sites, so
this will be a much rarer event").
28. See Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 9. "If the chance
occurrence of a single mutation that affects a target site is 10-8, then the
chance of two such mutations, independently affecting two target sites,
occurring together is 10-16." Id.
29. Hollomon & Brent, supra note 2, at 1161.
30. Id. at 1160 (describing resistance to multi-site fungicides as
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B. The Use ofBroad FraudStatutes to Combat the Evolution
ofResistant Strains of Fraud
Fraud, just like plant disease, can be devastating because it
has the potential to deprive an individual victim of his or her
life's savings.3 1 When these effects on individual victims are
aggregated, they can be societally devastating, as well as having
the potential to contribute to a national financial crisis. 3 2 As a
result of these potential effects, prosecution under federal fraud
statutes is a key tool to combat fraud. 3 But federal fraud
statutes-like fungicides-are potentially susceptible to
resistance.
A federal fraud statute's susceptibility to resistance depends
on whether it is drafted specifically or broadly, with the former
being far more susceptible to resistance. 34 As articulated by one
commentator, "[f]raud is by its very nature bounded only by the
versatility of the human imagination." 3 5 As a consequence, akin
"extremely rare").
31. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic
Crimes, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 39, 53-54 (2001) (providing "[a] sampling
of the voices of victims of non-violent crimes"); Chad Bray, Madoff Victims
Vent Their Frustrationsat Scam - Letters Released by Prosecutors Offer a
Look at the Heartbreak, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2009 (describing dozens of
letters received from Madoff victims regarding their frustration with the
financial ruin they have been left in).
32. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, xviii (2011), available at http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn media/fcicreports/fcicfinal reportconclusions.pdf. "Unfortunately-as has been the
case in past speculative booms and busts-we witnessed an erosion of
standards of responsibility and ethics that exacerbated the financial crisis.
This was not universal, but these breaches stretched from the ground level to
the corporate suites." Id. at xxii. The Commission concluded that
widespread mortgage fraud was one of the causes of the financial crisis. Id.
at xxii.
33. Robert S. Bennett, Attorney General Eric Holder Testifies Before the
FCIC, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI
ORDER NO. 27437 at 3 (2010) (quoting Attorney General Holder). "The
Department has a long history of prosecuting financial fraud-and we will
continue to do so. . . . [O]ur goal is not just to hold accountable those whose
conduct may have contributed to the law meltdown, but to deter such future
conduct as well." Id.
34. See infra notes 35 - 52 & accompanying text.
35. Mark Zingale, Note, Fashioninga Victim Standard in Mail and Wire
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to a fungi's resistance to a single-site fungicide, Chief Justice
Burger noted that the "ever-inventive American 'con artist' can
often evade the scope of a specific fraud statute b changing
just one component of his or her fraudulent scheme.
If an actor takes steps to thwart the state from applying a rule
to the actor, the state may face a choice of either abandoning
pursuit of the actor or expanding the rule to reverse the
effects of the actor's thwarting behavior, producing
overbreadth in the rule. Or, thinking ahead a move or more,
the state may prefer in the first instance to choose a broad
prohibition that is less easily avoided.3 7
General fraud statutes, however, which fill in the gaps among
more specific statutes, are less easily evaded.3 8 Just as a fungus
is unlikely to mutate sufficiently to resist a multi-site fungicide,
a perpetrator of fraud is unlikely to evade the prescripts of a
broad fraud statute. 39
The mail and wire fraud statutes are prime examples of broad
federal fraud statutes, 4 0 requiring only the following elements
for conviction:

Fraud: Ordinarily Prudent Person or Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 795, 815 (1999) ("The law 'does not define fraud; it needs
no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity."')
(citing & quoting Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941)).
36. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 407 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("The criminal mail fraud statute must remain strong to be able to
cope with the new variety of fraud that the ever-inventive 'con artist' is sure
to develop.").
37. Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1491, 1494 (2008).
38. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing
Story of the "Evolution" of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 3
(1983) (arguing "for statutory reform" because "if we freeze the evolution of
the statute, new forms of predatory behavior will appear to which the
legislature cannot realistically be expected to respond quickly").
39. Buell, supra note 37, at 1494; see also Jeffrey Standen, An Economic
Perspective on Federal CriminalLaw Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249,
287-88 (1998) ("Congress' interest in coverage is satisfied best by writing
statutes to the limit of ambiguity that courts will tolerate.") (footnote
omitted).
40. Elder, supra note 15, at 707 ("The mail fraud statute occupies a unique
position in federal criminal law as one of the last broad and amorphous
criminal statutes.").
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(i) a scheme to defraud that includes a material deception;
(ii) with the intent to defraud; (iii) while using the mails,
private commercial carriers, and/or wires in furtherance of
that scheme; (iv) that did result or would have resulted in the
loss of money or property or the deprivation of honest
services. 41
These elements encompass a broad range of conduct. First, as
noted by Professor John Coffee, the term "scheme to defraud . .
. comes as close to a general prohibition of evil intent[J" rather
than imposing a limitation on the reach of the mail and wire
fraud statutes. 2 Moreover, the object of the fraud is similarly
unbounded, requiring merely the loss of money, property, or
honest services. 4 3 Consequently, even after the Supreme
Court's recent ruling in Skilling that only schemes involving
bribery or kickbacks fall within the scope of "honest services
fraud,"4 4 it remains "rare that criminal conduct cannot be placed
within [the] reach[]" of these statutes. 4 5 One commentator
provided the following humorous example of the breadth of
conduct that falls within the scope of the mail fraud statute:
"[A] boy away at camp lies to his mother about winning the
soccer match because he knows she will send him a batch of
cookies. While he has technically committed mail fraud, no
prosecutor would charge the child for lying to his mother in a
letter." 46
Indeed, the ability of the mail and wire fraud statutes to
ensnare fraudsters who fall outside the scope of more specific
41. Christopher J. Stuart, Mail and Wire Fraud, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
813, 816 (2009) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)); see also Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 20-25 (1999).
42. Coffee, supra note 38, at 27 ("No other term in the federal criminal
lexicon seems as all embracing as 'scheme to defraud."').
43. Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud,48 AM. U. LAW. REv. 729, 747-48
(1999) [hereinafter Podgor, Criminal Fraud] (citing the mail fraud statute as
an example of a "generic fraud statute" whose focus "is almost exclusively
on the fraud and not on the object of the offense").
44. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010) (quoting
United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 1999)).
45. Ellen S. Podgor, Tax Fraud-MailFraud: Synonymous, Cumulative
or Diverse?, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 903, 903 (1989) [hereinafter Podgor, Tax
Fraud].
46. Todd E. Molz, Comment, The Mail FraudStatute: An Argument for

Repeal by Implication, 64 U.CHI. L. REv. 983, 1001 (1997).
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statutes is central to the debate regarding their appropriate
breadth.4 7 In reference to this role, the mail and wire fraud
statutes have been described as "a first line of defense[,]" 48 "a
stopgap device . . . ,"49 and "a virtual catch-all federal fraud
Most recently, Senator Leahy alluded to this role of
statute.
the mail and wire fraud statutes when introducing legislation to
expand the meaning of "deprivation of honest services": 51 "Too
often, loopholes in existing laws have meant that corrupt
conduct can go unchecked. The honest services fraud statute
has enabled prosecutors to root out corrupt and fraudulent
conduct that would otherwise slip through those loopholes we
must tighten it so it can perform that important role again."95'2 In
47. See, e.g., United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1079 (1st Cir.
1997) ("The broad language of the mail and wire fraud statutes are both their
blessing and their curse[] [because] [t]hey can address new forms of serious
crime that fail to fall within more specific legislation."); United States v.
Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Over the years the
public has been subjected to fraudulent schemes beyond those specifically
referred to in the statute, and resourceful prosecutors have used the mail
fraud statute effectively and properly against all those schemes."). See also
Randall D. Eliason, Surgery With A Meat Axe: Using Honest Services Fraud
to Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 929, 954-

55 (2009) ("[O]ne of the virtues of mail and wire fraud over the years has
been the ability of prosecutors to use those malleable statutes to pursue
criminal conduct that may implicate federal interests but may not clearly be
covered by more targeted federal legislation. One example of the use of mail
and wire fraud to fill such a legislative gap is the prosecution of state and
local corruption.") (internal citation omitted); Elder, supra note 15, at 712-13
("In the last few decades, federal mail fraud prosecutors expanded the mail
fraud statute's scope to reach new 'cutting-edge' crimes. Prosecutors may
use the mail fraud statute to prosecute crimes that lack any other statutory
reference.").
48. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
49. Id.; see also Podgor, Tax Fraud,supra note 45, at 904 (discussing how
the mail fraud statute "later came to be characterized as the 'stopgap'
provision because the mail fraud statute was used to criminalize conduct that
was morally reprehensible but was omitted from the literal terms of other
criminal statutes") (internal citations omitted).
50. Eliason, supra note 47, at 953.
51. 156 CONG. REc. S7631 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Leahy for himself, Sen. Whitehouse, & Sen. Kaufman).
52. Id. See also Molz, supra note 46, at 985. "[T]he broad language of
the mail fraud statute allows courts to adapt the statute to new forms of
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this way, the mail and wire fraud statutes operate much like a
multi-site fungicide; preventing the evolution of resistant types
of fraud by capturing virtually all potential new frauds within
their reach.
C. Differences Between The Roles of Fungicides in Fighting
Fungi and FraudStatutes in Fighting Fraud
As explained above, multi-site fungicides and broad fraud
statutes play a similar role in fighting the evolution of resistant
strains of fungi and fraud.5 3 However, the analogy is not perfect
for three reasons: a lack of a causal relationship, an unknown
mode of action, and the ability of choice regarding application.
First, there is not a causal relationship between the
application of fungicides and the existence of resistant strains of
fungi, but a causal relationship does exist between the scope of
fraud statutes and the existence of resistant strains of fraud.5 4
Fungicides do not cause the gene mutations that create resistant
strains of fungi; they merely select for these naturally occurring
mutants.5 5 Fraud statutes, however, can cause a would-be
perpetrator of fraud to alter his or her conduct so as to evade the
strictures of the statute.5 6 Ideally, the actor is deterred from his
or her fraudulent course altogether.
In a less perfect world,
the actor-the aforementioned "ever-inventive American 'con
artist' -changes his or her modus operandi so as to fall
fraud, thereby deterring criminals from finding and exploiting loopholes and,
by delegating lawmaking power to the courts, lowering the cost of legislating
for Congress." Id.
53. See supra Part II.A-B.
54. See infra notes 55-59 & discussion.
55. Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 12 (explaining that resistance
develops "from selection of initially rare mutants").
56. Buell, supra note 37, at 1495 (arguing that "if the criminal actor is
resourceful and strategic - which often means the actor is particularly
threatening and blameworthy - the failure to focus on the dynamism of the
regulated actor can be a significant mistake").
57. See, e.g. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (asserting
the Congressional aim of the Securities Act of 1933 was "to deter fraud and
manipulative practices in the securities markets") (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77a, et
seq. (West 2011)).
58. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 407 (1974) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
The criminal mail fraud statute must remain strong to be able to cope
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outside the scope of current prohibitions.5 9 in essence, fungi
lack free will to change their genetic makeup so as to avoid a
fungicide, while fraudsters possess the ability to alter their
conduct so as to avoid a fraud statute.
Second, a fungicide's mode of action is not always known to
be either multi-site or single-site, adding to the complexity of
managing resistance. 6 0 A statute's breadth, on the other hand, is
usually anticipated at the time of drafting and passage, allowing
for greater understanding of the statute's role in criminalizing
fraud. 6 ' Of course, this is not always the case, as exemplified
by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
statute, whose reach now far exceeds the prosecution of
organized crime.
Finally, a grower of crops must pick and choose among
with the new varieties of fraud that the ever-inventive American 'con
artist' is sure to develop. Abuses in franchising and the growing
scandals from pyramid sales schemes are but some of the threats to
the financial security of our citizenry that the Federal Government
must be ever alert to combat.
Id.
59. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (9th ed. 2009) (defining modus
operandi as "[a] method of operating or a manner of procedure; esp[ecially]
a pattern of criminal behavior so distinctive that investigators attribute it to
the work of the same person").
60. Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 10-11 ("Formerly it took a
long time to identify a mode-of-action . . . . It is now usual for a new
fungicide group to be introduced with some information on its mode-ofaction... ").
61. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544
(1983) (suggesting "that unless the statute plainly hands courts the power to
create and revise . . . the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases

anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process").
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (West 2011).
63. Sarah Baumgartel, The Crime of Associating with Criminals? An
Argument for Extending the Reves "Operation or Management" Test to
RICO Conspiracy, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (2006) ("Today,
RICO reaches past the prosecution of organized crime to encompass what
might otherwise be categorized as everyday business fraud, securities
violations, political corruption, and various other white collar crimes.");
Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial
Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 139
(1995) (arguing that RICO's "use has expanded beyond those areas it was
originally designed to combat to include within its ambit conduct that few
envisioned as 'racketeering activity').
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A grower's decision to apply a single-site
fungicides.64
fungicide may allow a resistant strain of fungi to survive and
flourish. No such choice must be made with respect to statutes
because they apply simultaneously. The mere enactment of a
broad fraud statute operates like a consistent application of
multi-site fungicide to a crop. The choice among fraud statutes,
to the extent one is eventually made, occurs at the prosecution
stage.
Despite these differences between the operations of
fungicides and fraud statutes, sufficient similarities exist that
lessons learned in the context of plant disease inform the debate
about the appropriate breadth of fraud statutes.
III. MULTI-SITE FUNGICIDES AND BROAD FRAUD STATUTES ARE
BOTH UNDER PRESSURE

As discussed above, multi-site fungicides and broad fraud
statutes are effective in preventing the evolution of resistant
strains of fungi and fraud because they are difficult to evade.
But, both multi-site fungicides and broad fraud statutes face
Multi-site fungicides are subject to
increased scrutiny.
increased regulatory pressure, 65 which can interfere with the
ability to register or re-register these fungicides for sale.6 6
Multi-site fungicides are subject to this scrutiny because, as
victims of their own success in managing resistance, they are
used frequently 6 7 and because they are viewed as being more
FRAC
COMM.,
ACTION
RESISTANCE
FUNGICIDE
64.
See
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUNGICIDE MIXTURES DESIGNED TO DELAY
at
available
2010),
(Jan.
1
EVOLUTION
RESISTANCE
http://www.frac.info/frac/publication/anhang/Resistance%20and%20Mixture
s%20Jan2O10_ff.pdf [hereinafter FRAC RECOMMENDATIONS] (discussing
the grower's decision-making process as he or she chooses which fungicide
or fungicides to apply to a crop pursuant to a "disease control programme").
65. See id. at 2 (noting that "more regulatory restrictions are being
imposed on multi-site fungicides . . .").

66. In the United States, for example, under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, absent an exception, "no person in any State
may distribute or sell to any person any pesticide that is not registered . . ."
with the Environmental Protection Agency. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (West 2011).
67. Gullino et al., supra note 18, at 1082 (noting that multi-site fungicides
like "mancozeb have undergone extensive regulatory review in many
countries, primarily because of their frequency of use and worldwide
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likely to have problems with off-target toxicity. 68 Broad fraud
statutes are criticized for comparable reasons.
First, like multi-site fungicides, broad fraud statutes are used
extensively, 69 often in factual scenarios where more specific
In recognition of this
fraud statutes are on the books.
phenomenon, commentators have described the mail and wire
fraud statutes as "bread-and-butter statutes for federal
prosecutors of white-collar crime"70 and, even more colorfully,
as "what Archimedes long souqht-a simple fulcrum from
which one can move the world."
Conduct falling within the
scope of myriad specific statutes-including antitrust
violations,7 2 securities fraud,7 3 bank fraud,7 4 insurance fraud,
election fraud,76 money laundering, real estate fraud,78 credit

importance to agriculture").
68. Russell, supra note 26, at 23 ("Such compounds [with multi-site
modes of action] are likely to be general toxophores and may thus not pass
today's stringent regulatory processes."); McGrath, supra note 2 ("Most
fungicides being developed today have a single-site (specific) mode of action
because this is associated with lower potential for negative impact on the
environment, including people and other non-target organisms.").
69. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS RESOURCE CENTER, available at

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/. In 2009, of the 9,183 defendants charged in
the filing offense category of "fraud," 402 defendants were charged with
wire fraud, and 502 defendants were charged with mail fraud. Id. (Note that
some of the 9183 defendants were likely charged with both wire and mail
fraud.) For purposes of comparison, 101 defendants were charged with
violating the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287, and 58 defendants were
charged with securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j. Id.
70. Eliason, supra note 47, at 953.
71. Coffee, supra note 38, at 3.
72. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2011).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (West 2011).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (West 2011).
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1 (1991).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
77. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (West 2011); United States v. Santos,
553 U.S. 507 (2008).
78. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341; James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v.
Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927).

86

John Marshall Law Journal

[Vol. V

card fraud, 7 9 identity theft,80 health care fraud,8 1 tax fraud, 82 and
franchise fraud 8 3 -can also potentially be charged as mail or
wire fraud. 84 Indeed, evidence suggests that prosecutors often
choose to charge mail or wire fraud, even if the alleged conduct
falls within the scope of a more specific statute.8 5
Just as the widespread use of multi-site fungicides has
contributed to increased regulatory scrutiny, the extensive use
of the wire and mail fraud statutes has been widely criticized,
especially where the alleged conduct sounds in a more specific
fraud statute. First, this practice renders superfluous the more
specific criminal statutes, which often reflect a nuanced
Congressional determination of the scope of criminality within a
specific factual scenario.86 Moreover, this use of the so-called
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (West 2011).
80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (West 2011) ("Aggravated identity
theft"); Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (West 2011).
82. 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (West 2011).
83. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341; 15 U.S.C. § 2806 (West 2011).
84. See Eliason, supra note 47, at 955; Podgor, Tax Fraud,supra note 45,
at 908; Standen, supra note 39, at 252-53; David Overlock Stewart, Raising
the Stakes: Resisting the Upward Transformation of Antitrust and Fraud

Charges, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 208 (1993); Stuart, supra note 41, at 81415; Elder, supra note 15, at 715.
85. As one of this Article's authors has previously documented, out of a
data set "[o]f the seventy-nine cases sounding in securities fraud . . . ,
prosecutors charged wire or mail fraud in forty-nine cases, or sixty-two
percent[]" of the time. Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime's Gray
Area: The Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72

ALB. L. REv. 1, 9 n.32 (2009) (explaining how the data was compiled).
86. Coffee, supra note 38, at 3 ("Useful as this expansion [of the mail and
wire fraud statutes] may be to the prosecutor, its consequence is also to
dwarf and trivialize much of the remainder of substantive federal criminal
law. Statutory defenses in other more limited statutes would thereby be
circumvented, and the power of the prosecutor over the defendant would be
measurably enhanced.") (internal citation omitted); Eliason, supra note 47, at
934 ("The concern now is that prosecutors are frequently discarding the
scalpel of bribery and gratuities altogether and instead are performing
surgery with the meat axe of honest services fraud."); Molz, supra note 46, at
985 ("'[B]ad' gap-filling occurs when prosecutors and courts use the mail
fraud statute to fill gaps in existing statutes, undermining the congressional
judgment embodies in those statutory gaps."); Standen, supra note 39, at 291
("[P]rosecutors when faced with such a plethora of competing provisions
will tend to resist exploring the complexity of the code and will tend to
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"wire/mail fraud run-around" imposes criminal liability on
some "conduct that is not even civilly actionable." 87
Furthermore, because of the sentencing disparities between mail
and wire fraud and more specific statutes, the prosecutor, in
making charging decisions, has wide discretion over the
defendant's potential sentence.88 As a result, the prosecutor
wields substantial-perhaps undue-leverage during plea
negotiations. 89
In addition, just as multi-site fungicides pose a potential
concern for off-target toxicity, the vagueness of broad fraud
statutes potentially causes harm. First, the vagueness of broad
fraud statutes risks running afoul of due process,90 which
requires that a criminal statute "clearly define the conduct it

charge offenders under one of the several omnibus statutes, such as mail
fraud, thereby rendering much of Congress' Herculean effort in writing so
many statutes superfluous.") (internal citation omitted).
87. Couture, supra note 85, at 11-12 (emphasis added) (demonstrating that
the materiality standard for wire and mail fraud is lower than for securities
fraud, resulting in the criminalization of false statements that are not civilly
actionable).
88. Podgor, Tax Fraud,supra note 45, at 924 ("Thus, by proceeding with
mail fraud [as opposed to tax fraud], the government is not only assured of a
felony conviction, but in some cases a greater prison sentence against the
defendant.") (footnote omitted); Standen, supra note 39, at 251-52 (arguing
that the overlap among statutes with different sentencing ranges and the
mandatory nature of sentencing guidelines affords prosecutors undue
discretion over punishment).
89. Podgor, Tax Fraud, supra note 45, at 904 (noting that the ability to
charge mail fraud rather than tax fraud may "strengthen the government's
ability to obtain a plea bargain or a compromised jury verdict"); Stewart,
supra note 84, at 213-14 (citing examples of disparate sentencing guidelines
depending on the addition of fraud counts). "The power to transform an
antitrust case into a fraud prosecution provides a powerful club to force plea
agreements." Id. at 213.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"); U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, with out due process of law[.]"). "To satisfy due process, 'a penal
statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."'
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927-28 (2010) (quoting Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
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proscribes "91 for the benefit of both the law abider and the law
enforcer.9f Indeed, in the context of mail/wire fraud, the
Supreme Court in Skilling relied on "the due process concerns
underlying the vagueness doctrine" to interpret "honest
services" fraud as including only frauds involving bribery and

kickbacks. 9 3
Moreover, the vagueness necessitated by broad fraud statutes,
even if within Constitutional constraints, imposes societal costs.
First, uncertainty chills lawful conduct, quelling legitimate
market behavior for fear of later second-guessing by a
prosecutor. 9 4 Second, by effectively prohibiting everything
sounding in fraud and then leaving it to prosecutors to decide
which subsets of illegal behavior to prosecute, Congress
delegates its lawmaking function, implicating separation of
power concerns. 95 This delegation to prosecutors also enables
91. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part & concurring in the judgment).
92. Id. "Our cases have described vague statutes as failing 'to provide a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or [as being]
so standardless that [they] authorize[e] or encourage[e] seriously
discriminatory enforcement."' Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553
U.S. 285, 304 (2008)); Brian Slocum, RICO and the Legislative Supremacy
Approach to Federal Criminal Lawmaking, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 639, 653
(2000) ("[A]n indispensable requirement of the unconstitutionally vague
doctrine is that criminal statutes provide sufficient 'guidance' not only to
those who must obey the laws but also to those who must interpret the
laws.").
93. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931. "To preserve the statute without
transgressing constitutional limitations, we now hold that § 1346
criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law."
Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of FederalCriminal-Lawmaking, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 13 (1997) ("There may be reason to be concerned
about unfair surprise, for example, when courts adopt contentious and
imaginative readings of the securities fraud and antitrust laws because these
statutes govern the behavior of individuals who are engaged in legitimate
market behavior and who legitimately look to law to guide their conduct.")
(citation omitted); Zingale, supra note 35, at 814 ("[A]nother potential
disadvantage to this broader [victim] standard [in mail and wire fraud]: an
expansion of governmental second-guessing of arm's-length business
transactions among private citizens.
Were mail-fraud prosecution
widespread enough, such governmental meddling could possibly lead to a
chilling effect on an otherwise robust free-market economy.").
95. Molz, supra note 46, at 984 ("[P]rosecutors, aided by courts, use the
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discriminatory enforcement. 9 6 Finally, by affording prosecutors
the discretion to pick and choose the areas of emphasis within
broad statutes, statutes of this nature "interfere with the
effective implementation of any rational system of national
priorities."97
In sum, both multi-site fungicides and broad fraud statutesalthough effective at preventing the evolution of resistant strains
of fungi and fraud-are subject to increased scrutiny. As a
consequence, scientists and lawmakers alike face the challenge
of developing additional means of preventing resistance by
fungi and fraudsters, while avoiding the costs associated with
multi-site fungicides and broad fraud statutes.
IV. ALTERNATIVES CAN PREVENT THE EVOLUTION OF
RESISTANT STRAINS, WHILE AVOIDING THE COSTS ASSOCIATED
WITH MULTI-SITE FUNGICIDES AND BROAD FRAUD STATUTES

In the face of increased regulatory pressure, scientists have
developed alternative means of managing fungicide resistance,
with some success. 9 8
These alternatives include the
combination of several single-site fungicides, the combination
of single-site and multi-site fungicides, and non-fungicide
solutions. These alternatives, which have already been tested in
the context of fungicides, shed light on the following potential
alternatives to reliance on broad fraud statutes: the combination
[mail fraud] statute to fill gaps in the criminal law left by Congress, despite
the Constitution's declaration that 'all legislative powers' therein granted are
vested in the Congress.") (internal citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 1); Slocum, supra note 92, at 653 ("When a statute is too vague to
provide sufficient guidance, the judiciary is placed in the position of
usurping the property function of the legislature by 'making the law' rather
than interpreting it."); Jack Stark, The Proper Degree of Generality for
Statutes, 25 STATUTE L. REV. 77, 80 (2004) ("If the three branches of

government ought to be distinctly separate, counsel should be wary of
drafting very generally and thereby allocating to the judicial and executive
branches considerable power to interpret the law.").
96. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring
in the judgment) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304
(2008)).
97. Coffee, supra note 38, at 10 (footnote omitted).
98. See, e.g., Dale L. Shaner, Herbicide Resistance: Where Are We? How
Did We Get Here? Where Are We Going? 9 WEED TECH. 850 (1995).
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of specific fraud statutes, the combination of broad and specific
fraud statues, and non-statutory means of combating fraud.
A. The CombinationofSingle-Site Fungicidesor Specific
FraudStatutes To Combat the Evolution ofResistant Fungi or
Fraud
As an alternative to multi-site fungicides, scientists have
successfully combined multiple single-site fungicides. 99 By
combining several single-site fungicides, each of which would
individually be highly susceptible to resistance, scientists can
reduce the likelihood of selecting for resistant biotypes, while
avoiding many of the regulatory concerns associated with multisite fungicides. 100 These combinations are especially effective
when the combined fungicides are negatively cross-resistantwhen the development of resistance to one of the fungicides
renders the strain more susceptible to another fungicide in the
combination.101

Similarly, several prominent scholars have advocated
replacing generic fraud statutes like the mail and wire fraud
99. Gullino et al., supra note 18, at 1081 ("Mixtures of fungicides that
combine a high resistance risk with . . . another single-site fungicide that is

not cross-resistant to its mixing partner [is] a common response to this
problem."); but see FRAC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, at 2-3

("[M]ixtures between single-site fungicides are appearing in the market and
it is clear that more care regarding the resistance statutes in pathogen
populations needs to be taken when recommending them.").
100. Hollomon & Brent, supra note 2, at 1161.
Evolution of resistance is favored by the sole repeated use of
fungicides with the same mode of action. Involving fungicides with
other modes of action and other disease control measures may stop
or, at the very least, slow down the evolution of resistance,
benefiting farmers and manufacturers, and prolonging the usefulness
of the few modes of action available in practice, which have been
identified and developed at considerable expense of both public and
private resources.
Id.
101. Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 14 ("Exposure of pathogens
to two fungicides that exhibit this negative cross-resistance, should greatly
reduce any resistance risk associated with either component, because a shift
to resistance against one automatically confers sensitivity against the
other."); Dekker, supra note 22, at 32-33; Gressel, supra note 2, at 1166
(explaining "negative cross-resistance" [in the context of herbicides]; a
mutant resistant to one herbicide was supersensitive to another").

No. 1]

The EvolutionaryBiology ofFungi and Fraud

91

statutes with a combination of specific, non-overlapping
statutes.102 Of these scholars, Professor Ellen S. Podgor
explains that a fraud statute can be drawn with more specificity
by "focusing on the object of the offense, as opposed to the
fraud component." 0 3 Although implementing this proposal
would require additional legislation, it would not expand the
current scope of criminalityl 04 nor entail excruciating
specificity. '

No scholar has explicitly incorporated the concept of negative
cross-resistance into this proposed solution, although it would
seem to apply equally to fungi and fraud. For example, when
drafting a statute that prohibits fraud in connection with the
offer or sale of registered securities, Congress should anticipate
that potential fraudsters may adapt their behavior to evade the
scope of this statute, either by planning their offering to satisfy
an exemption from registration, or by disregarding the
registration requirements altogether.
Therefore, Congress
should simultaneously draft a statute that prohibits fraud in
connection with the offer or sale of unregistered securities.
These two statutes, although specific, would operate with
negative cross-resistance.
In the context of plant disease, the solution of combining
single-site fungicides solves the problem of overuse of multisite fungicides and allays concerns about potential off-target
toxicity, but it is not as effective as multi-site fungicides at
preventing resistance. Similarly, in the context of fraud, the
solution of combining specific fraud statutes solves the problem
102. Podgor, Criminal Fraud,supra note 43, at 735 ("This Article does
not call for increased criminalization to encompass more fraudulent conduct.
Rather, it calls for specificity within the criminal code."); Standen, supra
note 39, at 288 (describing the "definitional" approach to reform of the
criminal code where "specific crimes would be written with more precision,
and certain crimes deleted or merged").
103. Podgor, CriminalFraud,supra note 43, at 749.
104. Id. at 735 ("Additional statutes may be warranted, but the conduct
subject to prosecution need not be extended.").
105. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Do We Need a "Beanie Baby" Fraud
Statute?, 49 Am. U. L. REv. 1031, 1042 (2000). "Should the appropriate
statute be 'toy fraud' to encompass not only fraudulent Beanie Babies, but
also fraud with respect to Pokemons? Or perhaps product fraud would offer
a more efficient range for these criminal prosecutions." Id. (internal citation
omitted).
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of bull-dozing more specific fraud statutes and allays concerns
about undue vagueness, but it is not as effective as broad fraud
statutes at preventing the evolution of new types of fraud.
B. The Combinationof Multi-Site and Single-Site Fungicides
or Broadand Specific FraudStatutes To Combat the Evolution
ofResistant Fungi or Fraud

Scientists have developed a second alternative to extensive
use of multi-site fungicides: the combination of single-site
fungicides with a multi-site fungicide. 106 This solution does not
eliminate the use of multi-site fungicides and thus is not
immune to the increased regulatory scrutiny afforded multi-site
fungicides, but it can lower the use rate of multi-site
fungicides. 107 At the same time, the combination is far less
susceptible to resistance than a combination consisting only of
single-site fungicides. 0 8
Scholars have proposed a similar solution in the context of
coexistence combined with repeal. 109 Under this
fraud:
proposal, broad and specific fraud statutes continue to coexist,
but the broad statutes are repealed-either explicitly or by
implication-when the charged conduct falls within the scope
106. FRAC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, at 5 ("Mixing a high or

medium risk single site fungicide with a low risk multisite[]... has been, and
still is, a firm favorite for managing resistance development to the high or
medium risk fungicide."); Gullino et al., supra note 18, at 1081 ("Mixtures
of fungicides that combine a high resistance risk with a low risk multi-site
compound . .. [is] a common response to this problem."); see, e.g., Russell,

supra note 26, at 19 (explaining the resistance management strategy of "only
selling the chemistry in mixture with a compound from a different mode of
action, usually mancozeb").
107. FRAC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, at 5.

"In many cases,

reduced rates (compared to recommended solo use rates) of both the high or
medium risk and the low risk [multisite] components are used. The critical
requirement for such a mixture is that the does rates used for the individual
components must be capable of providing good disease control if used solo."
Id.
108. Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 31 (considering "important
conditions of use that affect risk . . . to be . . . alternation or combined

application with other types of fungicide with different mechanisms of action
and/or resistance, and preferably with lower inherent risk, can reduce risk").
109. Podgor, CriminalFraud,supra note 43, at 760 ("Precluding the use
of generic statutes when conduct can be prosecuted by a specific statute can
provide limitations.").
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of the specific fraud statute.11 0 As one commentator explains,
the operation of repeal by implication is as follows:
When Congress passes a criminal statute governing
particular conduct, the new statute will implicitly repeal the
mail fraud statute's coverage of that conduct. Courts and
prosecutors will then be forced to respect the subsequent
enactment of Congress. But because repeal by implication
does not rely on a particular theory of fraud to cabin the mail
fraud statute, prosecutors will still have the statute--their
most effective weapon against novel crimes--at their
disposal." 1

Although it is a minority position, 112 a few courts have held
that broad fraud statutes, such as the mail and wire fraud
statutes, are inapplicable in factual scenarios covered by
specific fraud statutes." 3 For example, in United States v.
Henderson,114 the court for the Southern District of New York
refused to allow tax fraud to be prosecuted as mail fraud. 1 5
The court is of the view that the statute does not include
within its proscription a scheme to defraud the Internal
Revenue Service in the collection of income taxes. There is
in such a case no need to use the mail fraud statute as a
"stopgap device" until "particularized legislation" is enacted

110. See id.
111. Molz, supra note 46, at 1007.
112. Podgor, Tax Fraud,supra note 45, at 916 (declaring the "minority
view" is found in "[t]he lone case clearly rejecting the government's use of
mail fraud charges for the mailing of fraudulent tax returns ... United States
v. Henderson[,]" 386 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)). In contrast, under the
majority view, "the mailing of a fraudulent tax return[]" is a permissible mail
fraud violation. Id. at 918 (internal citation omitted). See, e.g., Edwards v.
United States, 312 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1941) (rejecting the petitioner's
argument that the Securities Act of 1933 repealed by implication the mail
fraud statute as applied to securities) ("We see no basis for a conclusion that
Congress intended to repeal the earlier statute. The two can exist and be
useful, side by side.") (footnote omitted); United States v. Simon, 510 F.
Supp. 232, 236-37 (E.D. Penn. 1981) (rejecting the defendant's argument
that a specific statute dealing with Medicaid fraud preempted the
applicability of the more general mail fraud statute).
113. E.g., United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1053.
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"to deal directly with the evil," for Congress has enacted
legislation that affords adequate protection of the public
interest in the collection of income taxes.1 16
This solution, like a combination of multi-site and single-site
fungicides, would be effective in combating resistant strains of
fraud. Moreover, it could potentially lower the overall use rate
of broad fraud statutes and prevent the broad fraud statutes from
rendering the specific statutes superfluous. 1 17 This solution
would not, however, cure the vagueness (or prevent the
resultant harms) of broad fraud statutes.
C. Non-Fungicideor Non-Statutory Ways to Combat the
Evolution ofResistant Fungi or Fraud

Faced with effective but imperfect alternatives to multi-site
fungicides, scientists have proposed that growers implement
additional non-fungicide means of controlling plant disease.' 18
Examples include disease-resistant varieties, crop rotation,
hygienic practices,1 1 9 and bio-control agents like natural
predators. o Similarly, any discussion of the appropriate
breadth of fraud statutes should incorporate non-statutory means
of preventing the evolution of new strains of fraud. As such,
116. Id.; see Podgor, Tax Fraud,supra note 45, at 933. "In the wake of
overzealous prosecutions, prosecutorial misconduct, and misuse of office, it
is necessary for our courts to restrict the virtually unbridled power of
prosecutors. Requiring that tax fraud violations be charged as tax fraud and
not mail fraud will serve as a step in that direction." Id.
117. Molz, supra note 46, at 1007 ("Repeal by implication offers a way to
preserve the strength of the mail fraud statute while mitigating its
weaknesses.").
118. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Pesticides and Food: What
"Integrated

Pest

Management"

Means,

http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/food/ipm.htm
(explaining
that,
under
"Integrated Pest Management," growers coordinate among pest control
options, including "using mechanical trapping devices, natural predators
(e.g., insects that eat other insects), insect growth regulators, mating
disruption substances (pheromones), and . . . [t]he use of biological
pesticides . .

119. Fungicide Resistance, supra note 16, at 32 ("[T]he greater the use of

non-chemical methods, such as disease-resistant varieties, rotation of crops,
or hygienic practices . . . [the less] fungicide selection pressure.").
120. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 118; Russell, supra note 26, at 23

("Biocontrol will undoubtedly contribute more in the future[.]").
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education and increased enforcement represent two potential
avenues for achieving the goals of non-statutory prevention.
One non-statutory method of preventing the evolution of new
types of fraud is to educate the potential victim, thereby
depriving the fraud perpetrator of a target.12' For example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission publishes a manual, titled
Avoiding Fraud, which provides "tips to help you avoid being
scammed."l22 Similarly, the State Department, in recognition
that "[s]cams evolve constantly," publishes brochures to "help
alert you to the indicators of some common scams and actions

you should take[.]"l 2 3
A second non-statutory method of preventing the growth of
resistant strains of fraud is to increase enforcement of existing
specific fraud statutes. Ways to increase enforcement include
improved coordination between federal and state agencies,124
121. See, e.g., U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERV., Top Ten Ways to Prevent

Fraud, http://www.deliveringtrust.com/topten/index.php?videoToPlay-one.
To help educate the public, the Chief Postal Inspector, Guy Cottrell, and the
USPS Vice President and Consumer Advocate, Delores J. Killette, provide
the "top ten ways to prevent fraud": (1) "If it sounds too good to be true, it
probably is[;]" (2) "No one needs your help to transfer money in an out of
the United States[;]" (3) "Check you monthly statements[;]" (4) "Never
deposit a check if you don't know who sent it to you. Just because your
ATM or Internet bank account says 'funds available' doesn't mean the check
has cleared. Never accept a check for payment if the amount is greater than
what you're owed[;]" (5) "Your bank will never email or call asking for your
account number. Limit the amount of personal information you give out
over the phone or Internet[;]" (6) "There are legitimate work-at-home jobs
involving process checks[;]" (7) "Foreign lotteries are illegal in the United
States[;]" (8) "Never send money to a company you don't know before
checking with the Better Business Bureau, your financial advisor, or family
members[;]" (9) "Shred unwanted documents containing personal
information[;]" and (10) "It's a good idea to order your credit report once a
year, and review it thoroughly." Id
122. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Avoiding Fraud,What You Can Do to

Avoid Investment Fraud,http://investor.gov/investing-basics/avoiding-fraud
(identifying "red flags" and explaining "persuasion tactics" commonly used
by perpetrators of fraud).
123. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, International

Scams,

Financial

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cispa-tw/financial scams/financial scams_315
5.html.
124. See, e.g., FIN. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE,

Force, What

is

the

Financial Fraud Enforcement

About

the Task

Task

Force?,
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technologically advanced investigative techniques, 125 and
Because research suggests that
whistleblower protections.
fraud perpetrators are often repeat offenders, 127 prosecuting
these individuals early in their careers would potentially prevent
them from later developing new types of fraud. For example,
the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, established in
November 2009, is charged with "hold[ing] accountable those
who helped bring about the last financial crisis as well as those
who would attempt to take advantage of the efforts at economic
recovery." 2 8

http://www.stopfraud.gov/about.html [hereinafter FRAUD TASK FORCE].
125. Denise D. Callahan, Securities Fraudon the Internet Poses Problems
for Investors and Regulators, 2 No. 12 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC.
ELEC. AGE 14 (1999) (recommending that "customized search engines could
facilitate the detection of Internet securities fraud").
126. Comm'r Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Speech by
SEC Commissioner: Enlisting Whistleblowers in the Battle Against Securities
Fraud,
(Nov.
3,
2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spchl 1031 Olaa-whistleblowers.htm.
"I view a whistleblower program as having the potential to significantly
enhance the Commission's enforcement of the federal securities laws. A
strong whistleblower program is one that results in high-quality information
being submitted to the Commission and enhances the Commission's
enforcement program and message of deterrence." See also James A.
Kaplan, Whistle-Blowing is the Best Way to Fight Corporate Fraud,
available at
2:00
PM),
2010,
(Dec.
14,
FORBES.COM
http://www.forbes.com/2010/12/14/whistle-blower-personal-finance-doddfrank-act.html (discussing the advantages of "the new Investor Protection
Act, . . . a whistle-blower compensation fund

. . waiting to be disbursed at

the discretion of the Securities and Exchange Commission").
127. See, e.g., W. STEvE ALBRECHT ET AL., FRAUD EXAMINATION 46
(South-Western Pub., 3rd ed. 2008) ("The [second] highest rate of repeat
offenders is probably fraud perpetrators who are not prosecuted or
disciplined."); Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and
Deterrence, 113 PENN. ST. L. REv. 189, 214 (2008) (suggesting that many
securities fraud recidivists may be "'hard wired' to commit manipulative
crimes[]" and thus unlikely to be deterred by the threat of legal sanctions).
128. FRAUD TASK FORCE, supra note 124. ("The task force is improving
efforts across the government and with state and local partners to investigate
and prosecute significant financial crimes, ensure just and effective
punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, recover proceeds for
victims and address financial discrimination in the lending and financial
markets.").
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V. CONCLUSION

Plant biologists face the quandary of developing a fungicide
that, in addition to withstanding resistance, has an excellent
regulatory profile. In fact, some scientists have described this
as the "holy 2 rail for agrochemical industry fungicide discovery
programs."
Similarly, Congress and legal scholars face the
dilemma of drafting fraud legislation that, while being
unsusceptible to evasion, does not interfere with nuanced
specific legislation and is not unduly vague. As Professor
Coffee asks, "[w]hat compromise then is possible between strict
construction and infinite expansion?"1 30
Plant biologists' solutions in the quest for this "holy grail"
shed new light on alternative proposals to combat fraud, which
Congress should take into account when considering the Honest
Services Restoration Act.
If broad fraud statutes are
jettisoned altogether in favor of combinations of specific
statutes, drafters should incorporate concepts of negative crossresistance. To the extent that broad fraud statutes continue to
coexist with specific fraud statutes, the broad statutes should be
repealed-either explicitly or by implication-when the
charged conduct falls within the scope of the specific fraud
statute. Finally, statutory means of combating fraud should be
supplemented with non-statutory means, including education of
potential victims and increased enforcement of existing specific
fraud statutes.

129. Gullino et al., supra note 18, at 1082 ("The holy grail for
agrochemical industry fungicide discovery programs can probably be

defined as a product with low use rate, multi-site mode of action (i.e.,
low resistance risk), systemic properties, good plant selectivity, and

an excellent regulatory profile.").
130. Coffee, supra note 38, at 3.
Useful as this expansion [of the mail fraud statute] may be to the
prosecutor, its consequence is also to dwarf and trivialize much of
the remainder of substantive federal criminal law.

. . .

Yet

conversely, if we freeze the evolution of the statute, new forms of
predatory behavior will appear to which the legislature cannot
realistically be expected to respond quickly.
Id.
131. Honest Services Restoration Act, H.R. 1468, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011).

